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On Defining Conversational Coordination and Rapport
Abstract
The construct of rapport is arguably one of the central, if not the central, construct necessary to
understanding successful helping relationships and to explaining the development of personal
relationships. The role of nonverbal behavior in initiating and signaling rapport has its roots in the work of
Watzlawick, Beavin, and Jackson (1967). Tickle-Degnen and Rosenthal substantially advance our
knowledge about the relationship between rapport and nonverbal behavior in the meta-analyses
presented in this and other articles (see Tickle-Degnen & Rosenthal, 1987). My purpose in this response is
to offer a critical reaction to the conceptual analyses of this article and to end with what, I hope, are
constructive suggestions.
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On Defining Conversational Coordination and Rapport
Joseph N. Cappella
Annenberg School for Communication
University of Pennsylvania
The construct of rapport is arguably one of the central, if
not the central, construct necessary to understanding successful helping relationships and to explaining the development of personal relationships. The role of nonverbal behavior in initiating and signaling rapport has its roots in the work
of Watzlawick, Beavin, and Jackson (1967). Tickle-Degnen
and Rosenthal substantially advance our knowledge about
the relationship between rapport and nonverbal behavior in
the meta-analyses presented in this and other articles (see
Tickle-Degnen & Rosenthal, 1987). My purpose in this response is to offer a critical reaction to the conceptual analyses
of this article and to end with what, I hope, are constructive
suggestions.
For a construct to be a valuable one in scientific inquiry, it
must meet a variety of criteria, some of which are internal to
the construct itself and others external to the construct. The
former concern questions such as conceptual precision, operational clarity, absence of tautology, among others. The latter, external criteria concern the utility of the construct in
increasing our understanding of the processes under scrutiny.
Let me take up each of these general criteria in turn as applied
to the concept of rapport.
Rapport is defined as a feeling state experienced in interaction with another as interest, positivity, and coordination (or
balance). These internal states can be manifested behaviorally through signs of interest and involvement, signs of
positivity, and patterns of coordination, synchrony, or responsiveness in interaction, respectively. The authors make
cogent arguments for the necessity of both the interest and
positivity states being high for rapport to be present. What is
not as clear is why the feeling of coordination must also be
high. Certainly, the feeling of being "in sync" or in tune with
another is a positive feeling state. But can people distinguish
this feeling of positivity from the general positivity experienced in interacting with another? This raises the question of
whether the third component is necessary or, rather, is simply
another basis for general positivity and, hence, confounded
with the first component.
If the argument is that actual behavioral coordination leads
to positive feelings about the interaction and the other person, then that is a different claim, an important claim, and
one not without empirical backing (see Cappella, 1988, for a
review). Note that I am raising a question about the need for
"felt coordination" as a necessary feature of the definition of
rapport; I am not denying that behavioral coordination may
give rise to feelings of positivity and mutual interest.
I also have some serious questions about the definition of
behavioral coordination, both conceptually and operationally. Coordination could be defined in a wide variety of
ways: micromomentary synchrony in movement and speech
(Condon & Ogston, 1967), congruence of mean levels of
behavior (Jaffe & Feldstein, 1970), adjustment of rhythms
(Warner, 1988), responsiveness (Davis, 1982), topical coherence (Tracy, 1982), magnitude and direction of temporal
adjustment (Cappella, Palmer, & Donzella, 1990), among

others. The authors offer their own operational procedures
(to be discussed) but no conceptual definition of coordination
that either includes or excludes these listed techniques.
The problem that the missing definition creates can be
illustrated as follows. Suppose the behavioral activity of two
conversants begins at moderate levels, and over the course of
their interaction the activity levels trail off as the two become
fatigued. Random, lO-sec samples will seem to exhibit coordination in behavior, not because the persons are adjusting to
one another but rather because they are adjusting to an external force. Clearly, such baseline trends must be removed
from the data before coordination (i.e., adjustment to the
partner rather than adjustment to external, spurious forces)
can be accurately assessed. Without a definition of coordination, we would be forced to accept spuriously caused similarity in behavioral levels as evidence of coordination.
Consider, as a second example, the escalation of hostile
affect typical in conflicts between husbands and wives (Gottman, 1979). In one sense, the spiraling of action is a kind of
coordination; each isresponsive to the partner, matching and
raising the ante. If this is an example of coordination, then it
is certainly not a positive correlate of rapport; if it is not an
example of coordination, then does coordination only apply
to socially positive or neutral behaviors? If the latter, then
how do we account for partners who are attracted to one
another in part through adopting complementary patterns
of dominant and submissive behaviors (Orford, 1986)? The
absence of a definition of coordination does not allow researchers to assess the hypothesis that coordination is important to rapport in general; only in the context of the author's
own operational procedures can the hypothesis be evaluated.
The authors might respond that their operational definition
of coordination responds to these objections and to other
problems. Their molar definition of coordination uses judges
(or participants) to make evaluations of clips of interaction
on scales estimating whether the participants are in sync or in
tune with one another. The advantages of this approach are
its efficiency in comparison to more molecular approaches,
its use of context to assist judgment, and its simultaneous
inclusion of interactional meaning with process concerns.
The disadvantages are equally serious. The spuriousness
problem is not solved. Judgments of coordination, whether
by participants or observers, could be confounded withjudgments of positivity if judges' implicit theories of social interaction are that positive interactions are ones in which the
people are in sync. If this is the case, then the judges would
be assessing positivity and not synchrony, and the correlation
to rapport would be an artifact.
To this, the authors might reply that the Bernieri, Resnick,
and Rosenthal (1988) study shows that (a) artificial interactions created on tape to appear as if real and (b) interactions
between mothers and strange infants are judged less synchronous· than (c) actual interactions between mothers and
their own infants. However, I do not think that this evidence
is definitive. First, is it possible that the children who were
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paired with the stranger exhibited some sort of apprehension
or anxiety over being paired with an unfamiliar person and
that this (possible) behavioral difference in the infants explains the differences between the true and the switched and
double-crossed dyadic clips? The children tested were at an
age when stranger anxiety is relatively high, and the coders
could have cued into facial, gestural, or vocal differences
between these infants and the others who were interacting
with their own mothers.
My second concern focuses on the differences between the
altered-time-frame clips and the true dyadic clips. For example, suppose, in the first 5 sec of Minute 1 of the actual
interaction, the infant is fretting and that during the first 5 sec
of the comparably paired minute (say, Minute 3) the mother
is cooing and looking quite happy (i.e., exhibiting no signs
of distress or concern). Such a combination, even if multiplied only once or twice across the 50-sec clips, creates an
odd-looking interaction that may produce lowered ratings of
global synchrony because of gross mismatches in emotion
expressed, or activity exhibited.
Obviously, I am guessing about the character of the timealtered clips, but this rival explanation needs to be addressed.
The only way that I can see to address this rival hypothesis
and others that imagination might concoct is to actually code
the behaviors of the mother and infant in the clips and see if
the pattern of synchronous behaviors matches that provided
by the raters. Many of us who study nonverbal behavior
using molecular codings rather than ratings would be happy
to move to the less costly rating procedures if it can be shown
that coding and rating produce the same conclusions (if not
the same detailed results).
In sum, the absence of a conceptual definition of coordination and possible weaknesses in its operational definition
require further conceptual and empirical work before this
component of the definition of rapport can be accepted.
The authors set out to capture the "nature" of rapport, to
use their term. Such an enterprise is reminiscent of what
Hemple (1952) called "real" definition and implies directly
that rapport has a nature which is discoverable and that there
exists some position that privileges such a definition. But on
what epistemological grounds could one assess the success
or failure of a niltural definition? All such attempts are inherently circular and potentially tautologous. If rapport is defined as a tripartite feeling state involving interest, positivity,
and a balanced or smooth interaction, how can such a claim
be evaluated? Appeals to standard criteria of convergent and
discriminant validity will not suffice. because such appeals
actually hide the implicit theoretical claims concerning what
rapport should and should not correlate with and, in tum,
presume what the nature of rapport is, tacitly hypothesizing
its relationships with other constructs.
My own view of the scientific process is that it is constructive. That is, scientists do not discover the nature of
entities through observation, natural language analysis, or
the phenomenal experience of participants, rather they construct nature by the kinds of concepts and categories that
they impose on it through their definitions and theories. Science is not the passive reporting of direct observations but
the construction of observation, and hence reality, through
theory. Such a view is held more by practitioners and historians of science (e.g., Polanyi, 1958) than by philosophers
of science.
This view of concept formation as a constructive process

does not imply that any and all constructs are equally viable
candidates for acceptance by the scientific community. Neither does it imply that the process of construct formation is
nominal so that any definition is as sound as any other.
Rather, theory intervenes again. Viable concepts are those
constructions of the social and psychological world which
enter into networks of propositions (i.e., theories) in such a
way as to increase our understanding (i.e., prediction, causal
explanation, and control) of the phenomenon under scrutiny.
Thus, the evaluation of theoretical concepts in a constructivist science must be undertaken within a set of theoretical
linkages, not within the framework of the concept alone.
In short, whether one attempts to carry out the process of
construct explication as a realist or a constructivist, one must
assess the value of the explication in terms of the theoretical
success of the explication and not just in terms of the plausibility, utility, precision, historical adequacy, and so on of
the construct in isolation. Thus, I next turn to evaluating the
construct of rapport in terms of the theoretical ties it is proposed to have with other constructs.
I am afraid that the utility of the construct of rapport in
improving our understanding of interactional processes and
relationship development remains distant. The key theoretical claims involving rapport are found in the hypotheses
of Tickle-Degnen and Rosenthal's Figure 1, the discussion of
situational factors, and the relationship between feeling
states and behavior. Their Figure 1 represents the relative
weighting of the three components of rapport for different
times of interaction (i.e., increased familiarity). The first
problem with these hypotheses (and most hypotheses about
interaction and relationship stage) is that the predictor variables do not separate affect for, from knowledge about, the
other. When one compares strangers to friends on differences
in interaction, one is comparing zero-knowledge, neutralaffect partners to high-knowledge, positive-affect partners.
That is, knowledge and affect are confounded. The hypotheses of their Figure 1 would probably not be generated if the
"late" or "familiar" interactions were ones of enemies
rather than friends. The admonition here is simplythat stages
of relationships differ on several criteria, and if interactional
differences between stages are to be understood, then these
criteria must be sorted out.
The hypotheses of Figure 1 implicitly raise another important theoretical issue which the authors address. The behavioral signs of rapport will not always accompany the experience of rapport, due either to situational factors or to the
mismatch between feeling and behavior. Because the association between rapport and nonverbal behavior is central to
their analysis, discussion of the conditions under which the
association will be amplified or attenuated seems a necessary, if major, task. The analysis of situational factors reduces to claims of the sort: When situations promote goals
whose achievement requires attention, then the relationship
between rapport and nonverbal attention will be greater.
Such claims neither direct research in subtle ways nor offer
informative explanations. In effect, that which promotes attention gets attention.
The authors are also well aware of the fact that affective
state and behavior are not isomorphic with one another; the
same nonverbal behavior sometimes functions in very different ways in response to feeling states. The study byIckes,
Patterson, Rajecki, and Tanford (1982) showing that smiling
may be the result of two quite different feeling states, one
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positivity and the other anxiety, is a representative case. If
feeling states and their behavioral manifestation can shift in
direction of association as a function of personal and situational moderators, then the theory will be very limited in
scope until the way that moderators operate to alter the feeling-behavior relationship is specified. The authors do limit
the scope of the theory holding that "the context of an interaction is one in which the individuals have . . . friendly,
cooperative goals." The much more difficult question of the
effect of moderating conditions on the feeling-behavior association is left unaddressed.
In sum, the theoretical value of the construct of rapport
offered here is limited in its current stage offormulation. The
components of rapport, both internal states and behaviors,
may interact differently with relationship stage when the
affective and knowledge components are separated. The role
of situational and other moderating factors is acknowledged
but the nature of their interaction with behavioral, internal,
and relational states is not given serious theoretical consideration. The utility of the construct of rapport as defined by
Tickle-Degnen and Rosenthal will depend on these theoretical advances.
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Joseph N. Cappella, Annenberg School for Communication, University of Pennsylvania, Philadelphia, PA 19104.
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Rapport Is Not So Soft Anymore
Bella M. DePaulo and Kathy L. Bell
University of Virginia
There once was a paper whose core
Described three dimensions of rapport.
Positivity, attention, and
Coordination got mentioned,
But there's got to be something more.

When one of the authors of this commentary was growing
up, she was often fed a warm and tasty dish that made her feel
good inside. Sadly, though, the dish was called "cornmeal
mush" and so she was reluctant to extol its virtues to her
more tony friends. Recently, though, cornmeal mush has
been rediscovered and redubbed. Under the decidedly more
suave name of polenta, it appears on the menus of the most
chic restaurants, and the author can now mention offhandedly to her friends, "Oh, yes, my mother made that all the
time."
The history of the concept of rapport is a bit like that of
cornmeal mush. For a long time, rapport was just so mushy
that serious scientists were a little embarrassed to be associ-

ated with it professionally, much as they may have enjoyed a
bit of indulgence in private. But with the infusion of a bit of
rigor and vim from the scientific stoves of Tickle-Degnen
and Rosenthal, rapport doesn't seem quite so soft anymore.
For this we should all be grateful.
The salvation of the scientific respectability of rapport has
come none too soon. In the literature on survey research, for
example, ominous titles such as "Interview Rapport: Demise
of a Concept" began appearing more than a decade ago
(Goudy & Potter, 1975/1976). But the articles bearing these
titles were burying the old rapport-the cornmeal mush. The
polenta was yet to come. One of the ingredients that renders
the new rapport improved rather than just new is its construal
as a genuinely interactive phenomenon. In a way, the idea
that rapport necessarily refers to something about two or
more people, and never just one, seems glaringly self-evident. Yet earlier conceptualizations of rapport often fell
down on just this point. In the Goudy and Potter surveyresearch study urging the abandonment of the concept, rap-
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